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S.L.A.P.P. SUITS:
A FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUE AND BEYOND
ALICE GLOVER*
AND MARCUS JIMISON**
SLAPP suits function by forcing the target into the judicial arena where
the SLAPP filer foists upon the target the expenses of a defense. The
longer the litigation can be stretched out, the more litigation that can be
churned, the greater the expense that is inflicted and the closer the
SLAPP filer moves to success. The purpose of such gamesmanship
ranges from simple retribution for past activism to discouraging future
activisim .... Short of a gun to the head, a greater threat to First
Amendment expression can scarcely be imagined1
WESTCHESTER CouNTY, NEW YORK TRIAL JUDGE1
In the decade of the eighties, an interesting phenomenon began to
develop in the field of tort law2 - the Strategic Lawsuit Against Pub-
lic Participation (hereinafter referred to as the SLAPP suit).3 A
SLAPP suit is a legal maneuver used by a party, usually the plaintiff,
who wishes to stifle the expressions of another. In such cases, the
plaintiff typically initiates some type of tort action against a particular
defendant. Instead of seeking a specific legal remedy from this de-
fendant, the litigation is primarily instituted as a strategic move to in-
timidate that party into silence.4 The danger of a SLAPP suit is that
* Staff attorney at North Carolina North Carolina Industrial Commission and former law
clerk to Judge Elizabeth McCrodden of the North Carolina Court of Appeals. B.A., University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; J.D., North Carolina Central University School of Law.
** Staff attorney at North Carolina Prisoner Legal Services. B.A., University of North
Carolina at ChapelHill; J.D., North Carolina Central University School of Law.
1. Gordon v. Marrone, No. 185 44/90 Sup. Ct., Westchester County, N.Y. (April 13, 1992),
Decision at 26-28 (citations omitted).
2. A tort case is defined as: "A major classification category for civil cases that includes
cases involving a court action resulting from an injury or wrong committed either against a per-
son or against a person's property by a party who either did something that he was obligated not
to do, or failed to do something that he was obligated to do." CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT
ADMINISTRATORS & THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT MODEL STA-
TISTICAL DIRECTORY 61 (1989).
3. See George W. Pring, "SLAPPS" - Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation - A
New Ethical, Tactical, and Constitutional Dilemma, C534 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 937 (1990). Professors
George W. Pring and Penelope Canan of the University of Denver were two of the earliest
researchers in the area of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation. They developed the
term "SLAPP" to describe the phenomenon and initiated a detailed analysis and case study of
the problem of SLAPPS.
4. Id. at 939.
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average citizens exercising their constitutional right to free speech and
petitioning the government to redress their grievances are penalized
and threatened by litigation claiming tortious behavior, such as defa-
mation or libel.5
While this strategic maneuver is most often recognized in cases
which have a land-use or an environmental component, the strategy
has recently begun to gain momentum in other areas. For example,
the San Francisco Police Officers Association sued the NAACP6 for
fifty million dollars as a consequence of the NAACP's publicly voicing
concerns over police brutality in that area of California.7 In another
case, the National Organization for Women [hereinafter NOW] was
the target of a SLAPP suit when it organized a boycott in states where
the Equal Rights Amendment had not been passed. In response to
the boycott, the state Attorney General of Missouri sued NOW on the
basis that local businesses were detrimentally affected by the NOW
boycott.8
Because the definition of this legal area is as yet incomplete, there
are conflicting views on the topic, ranging from controversy over the
scope of a SLAPP suit to viable solutions available to combat SLAPP
suits.' A handful of state legislatures have found the problem trouble-
some enough to pass anti-SLAPP suit legislation aimed at discourag-
ing the temptation to initiate SLAPP suits.' °
This article will give an overview of perspectives on the scope of
SLAPP suits and their potentially devastating effect on the constitu-
tional right of free speech and the right to petition the government for
redress of grievances. This article will also analyze legislative solu-
tions adopted to date.
5. George W. Pring & Penelope Canan, "Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation"
("SLAPPS"): An Introduction for Bench, Bar and Bystanders, 12 BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 937, 938
(1992).
6. NAACP is the acronym for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People, an organization established in 1910 with the merging of the Niagara Movement headed
by W.E.B. DuBois and a group of concerned white citizens, dedicated to ending racial inequality
and segregation. The CONCISE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 581 (Avon Books 1983).
7. Pring, supra note 3, at 939.
8. Missouri v. NOW, 467 F. Supp. 289 (W.D. Mo. 1979), aff'd, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980).
9. Victor J. Cosentino, Comment, Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation: An Anal-
ysis of the Solutions, 27 CAL W. L. REV. 399, 401 (1993)(contending that the Pring definition of
SLAPPS is too restrictive in that it is limited to lawsuits based on petitioning the government on
a matter of "public interest or concern." Cosentino suggests that SLAPPS should also be distin-
guished from environmental countersuits).
10. See generally Edward W. McBride, Jr., The Empire SLAPPS Back. New York's Legisla-
tive Response to SLAPP Suits, 17 VT. L. REV. 925 (1993).
1995]
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I. MECHANICS OF SLAPP Surrs
While there have been a number of different approaches to defining
a SLAPP suit, it is generally accepted that SLAPP suits are "a re-
sponse by detrimentally affected parties to the activities of citizens
who petition the government."" SLAPPs are intended to silence
those citizens and "in doing so, SLAPPs effectively deny vocal citizens
their constitutional right to petition the government."' 2 A SLAPP
suit is distinguished from other intimidation mechanisms in that it spe-
cifically rechannels "efforts initiated in the political arena and recasts
them in the judicial arena.'
13
Professors Penelope Canan and George W. Pring, two of the pri-
mary analysts of this legal phenomenon, have categorized the devel-
opment of SLAPP suits into three separate stages. First, a citizen
exercises his constitutional rights by publicly addressing the govern-
ment on an issue of public concern. This is clearly protected speech
under the First Amendment petition clause. 4 Inevitably, the citizen's
view is opposed by an individual or a group of people who are
threatened by the speech because they stand to lose some interest,
often a monetary interest, because of the petition to governmental ac-
tion. 15 Second, those threatened by the citizen's activities attempt to
thwart further citizen activity by intimidating the citizen with a law-
suit. They file the lawsuit anticipating that the citizen will now be
forced to expend time and money in defending his actions instead of
pursuing the original activities of petitioning the government for a re-
dress of grievances. 16 Third, the defendant must offer a defense that
his original behavior was constitutionally protected under the First
Amendment. These three stages of a SLAPP suit cause the dispute to
shift into the judicial arena under the auspices of a tort case involving
such claims as defamation, libel, business torts and nuisance.
A prototypical and often cited illustration of a SLAPP suit centers
on the case of a developer who invests time and money into drafting
plans for a tract of land to be developed. As the proposal progresses,
11. Cosentino, supra note 9. at 399 (referring to Professors Canan and Pring's coining of the
term Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation).
12. Id.
13. See generally Penelope Canan & George W. Pring, Studying Strategic Lawsuits Against
Public Participation: Mixing Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, 22 LAW AND SOC'Y Rnv.
386 (1988); Penelope Canan & George W. Pring, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation,
35 Soc. PROBS. 506 (1988).
14. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S.
CONsT. amend. I.
15. Pring, supra note 3, at 940.
16. Id.
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the public becomes aware of the project through news accounts and
announcements of public hearings. Upon being alerted to the devel-
opment, some members of the public, often neighbors of the undevel-
oped land, become concerned over general environmental or public
health issues They begin to actively participate by writing letters to
the media or involving themselves in governmental hearings to ex-
press these concerns. This participation then hinders the original
plans of the developer, and in retaliation, the developer files a lawsuit
against the person or group of persons voicing their opposition.' 7 The
developer initiates the legal action in an effort to force the loosely-
organized citizens' group into redirecting their efforts away from voic-
ing concerns against the proposed development to focusing on defend-
ing themselves in a legal battle. Further, the developer is aware that
this litigation may scare or intimidate the group into terminating its
protests altogether.
II. THE CANAN AND PRING MODEL
Canan and Pring describe SLAPP suits as "attempts to use civil tort
action to stifle political expression."' 8 They suggest that "[t]hese law-
suits claim injury resulting from citizen efforts to influence the govern-
ment or sway voters on an issue of public significance."' 9 In reaching
this conclusion, Canan and Pring present a detailed case study of
Warembourg v. City Council of City of Louisville.2"
In Warembourg, Elizabeth Johnson and others petitioned the City
Council of Louisville, Colorado, in 1983, to vote against a plan to an-
nex a tract of land proposed for a housing development. The City
Council approved the annexation of the land, but Ms. Johnson was
able to obtain enough petition signatures to put the matter before the
public for a referendum. Rather than submit the issue to a vote, the
City Council reversed itself and repealed the ordinance permitting
annexation.2'
Consequently, the developer, Medema Homes, Inc., and the land-
owner, Klubert Warembourg, sued Ms. Johnson, three other petition
representatives, and the City Council of Louisville for constitutional
violations of due process and equal protection, as well as conspiracy to
unreasonably limit the development of property. The damages were
"for an amount to be determined at trial."'22 Canan and Pring contend
17. Cosentino, supra note 9, at 402.
18. Pring, supra note 3, at 939.
19. Id.
20. No. 83-CV-1231-2 (Boulder County Dist. Ct., Colo., dismissed Jan. 4, 1983).
21. Pring, supra note 3, at 940.
22. Pring, supra note 3, at 942-43.
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that Ms. Johnson and the three other petition representatives had
been "slapped" with a lawsuit by the developer and were subse-
quently forced to expend time, money and energy to wage a legal bat-
tle instead of pursuing the referendum issue.23
While Canan and Pring believe that hundreds of these types of law-
suits are initiated every year against average citizens who are simply
attempting to exercise their constitutional rights, the actual number of
such lawsuits is difficult to pinpoint because the traditional judicial
system in the United States allows such lawsuits to be camouflaged
among the thousands of tort claims filed each year.24 To further in-
crease the difficulty of statistical analysis, SLAPP suits, unlike normal
tort claims, do not have to be won in court in order to achieve objec-
tives. Because the goal of SLAPP suits is often political control rather
than a judicial outcome, success can often be equated with freezing
out the opposition and intimidating them into silence on that political
issue.
It is this political retaliation, through the law, that distinguishes
SLAPP suits from the commonly observed intimidation and retalia-
tion through litigation between commercial competitors, business
partners, labor and management, and regulatory agencies and licen-
sees. Strategic lawsuits against public participation, on the other
hand, claim injury from citizen efforts to influence a government body
or the electorate on an issue of public significance. 25 To further delin-
eate SLAPP suits from that business-related litigation, Canan and
Pring suggest five defining factors to more completely narrow the
definition.
First, the conduct upon which the lawsuit is based is generally pro-
tected speech or activity under the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution.2 6 While many citizens are not familiar with every
aspect of the Constitution, the First Amendment freedoms which are
key to our democratic system of government are taught to all Ameri-
cans at an early age.27
The First Amendment protects a wide variety of activities, and the
Supreme Court over the years has been reluctant to render decisions
which threaten these rights. While the Court has pronounced limits
on some types of speech such as obscenity,28 commercial speech,29 and
23. Pring, supra note 3, at 943.
24. See Pring, supra note 3, at 937.
25. Pring, supra note 3, at 939.
26. Pring, supra note 3, at 937.
27. McBride, supra note 10, at 925.
28. In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), the United States Supreme Court held
that obscenity was not protected by the First Amendment. Later Supreme Courts attempted to
define "obscenity," but the issue was not settled until the Court decided Miller v. California, 413
5
Glover and Jimison: S.L.A.P.P. Suits: A First Amendment Issue and Beyond
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1995
S.L.A.P.P. SUITS
"fighting words,"3 the speech which is the subject of SLAPP suits is
clearly protected by the First Amendment.3' Some of the activities
which trigger SLAPP suits include:
* Corresponding with public officials;
* Reporting violations to public health authorities;
* Speaking out at public hearings for land re-zoning issues;
* Circulating or simply signing a citizen petition;
* Testifying at school board meetings;
* Participating in peaceful demonstrations;
* Lobbying for legislative reform;
* Filing complaints with government agencies for consumer affairs,
civil rights or labor relations.
32
These activities form the foundation of what makes our country so
unique - the opportunity to challenge our elected officials and to
influence their decisions through the democratic process. "In a repre-
sentative democracy, government acts on behalf of the people, and
effective representation depends to a large extent upon the ability of
the people to make their wishes known to government officials acting
on their behalf. ' 33 Moreover, economic efficiencies are usually better
served when a credible cost-benefit analysis can be conducted. The
suppression of an opposing viewpoint inherently forecloses such
meaningful analysis, thereby increasing the likelihood that a govern-
mental entity may make inefficient decisions in allocating resources.
The second distinguishing factor of a SLAPP suit is that the defend-
ant is generally advancing causes of genuine public interest and is not
motivated by pecuniary or personal gain. The classic defendant is a
citizen (or perhaps a non-governmental advocacy group) who at-
U.S. 15 (1973). In Miller, the Court promulgated guidelines on obscenity, a three part analytical
framework for the trier of fact to use in determining whether material is obscene: (a) the first
prong of the test is whether the entire work would be considered to be appealing to the prurient
interest, using a reasonable person standard applying contemporary community practices; (b)
the second prong is whether the work describes in a patently offensive way sexual conduct which
is specifically detailed in the applicable state law; and (c) the final prong is whether the entire
work lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.
29. Commercial speech is generally defined as speech of any kind that advertises a product
or service for profit or for business purposes, or speech that has a dominant theme which is
simply to propose a commercial transaction. It is afforded protection of the First Amendment
but can be regulated in a number of permissible ways. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
30. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), the United States Supreme
Court held that speech or writing that, by its very utterance, tends to incite an immediate breach
of the peace is not constitutionally protected and may be prevented, punished or regulated by
the states. The test developed in Chaplinksy is whether or not men of common intelligence
would understand the words as likely to cause the average addressee to fight - words and
expressions that by general consent are "fighting words" when said "without a disarming smile."
31. Pring, supra note 3, at 937.
32. Canan & Pring, supra note 5, at 938.
33. Canan & Pring, supra note 5, at 942 (quoting from the opinion rendered in Protect Our
Mountain Env't, Inc. v. District Court, 677 P.2d 1361, 1364-65 (Colo. 1984)).
19951
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tempts to sway the opinion of some governmental entity by petition-
ing for the redress of grievances.34 Often, the only reason that a
defendant has become involved in the process is because of concern
that the proposed action will somehow harm the surrounding environ-
ment or become a public or private nuisance 35 to a neighborhood or a
local community. While some defendants have been nationally known
and well-organized advocacy groups, like the Sierra Club, most
SLAPP defendants are average citizens or ad hoc groups which are
formed for a one-time chance to mobilize forces against a local propo-
sal or project.
36
The third prong of the SLAPP suit delineation is the classification
of the plaintiff in the action. Most often, a SLAPP suit plaintiff is an
individual who believes, or an organization that contends, the contin-
ued statements or actions of the defendants are detrimental to the
advancement of the plaintiff's plans. The motivations of a SLAPP
plaintiff include retaliation in the judicial arena to political opposition
by the defendant, attempts to silence and intimidate the defendants
into terminating their activity against the threatened plaintiff, and of-
fensive strategy to prevent others from opposing the plaintiff's
plans.37 While there are different reasons which motivate SLAPP
plaintiffs to file these lawsuits, one commentator has suggested that
the common characteristic is an unfounded claim or a meritless
complaint.
38
Fourth, the complaints of SLAPP plaintiffs have traditionally al-
leged constitutional violations based on the following theories:
a. Defamation - The most frequent claim of SLAPP plaintiffs is
defamation. 39 Defamation is defined as a deliberately false statement,
either spoken or written, which allegedly injures another's reputation.
Words are defamatory if they harm the victim so as to damage his
reputation within the community or to discourage other people from
34. Canan & Pring, supra note 5, at 938.
35. Generally, a nuisance is considered to be something or some activity which annoys and
disturbs one in possession of his property, thereby hindering its ordinary use or occupation and
making it physically uncomfortable to him. Some examples are odors, smoke, noise or vibra-
tions. Patton v. Westwood Country Club Co., 247 N.E.2d 761, 763 (1969).
36. See David Sive, Environmental Litigation Countersuits and Delay, C427 A.L.I.- A.B.A.
1319, 1326 (1989).
37. McBride, supra note 10, at 928.
38. Jeffrey A. Benson & Dwight H. Merriam, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participa-
tion (SLAPPS): An Overview, C750 A.L.I. - A.B.A. 837, 840 (1992).
39. Thomas A. Waldman, SLAPP Suits: Weaknesses in First Amendment Law and in the
Courts' Responses to Frivolous Litigation, 39 UCLA L. REv. 979, at 986-87 (1992). See also
Penelope Canan & George W. Pring, Strategic Lawsuits Against Political Participation, 35 Soc.
PROBS. 506, 511 (1988).
7
Glover and Jimison: S.L.A.P.P. Suits: A First Amendment Issue and Beyond
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1995
1995] S.L.A.P.P. SUITS 129
continued relationships with the victim. The definition includes both
libel or slander. °
This type of claim is illustrated by the New York case of a develop-
ment company, Terra Homes, which filed a defamation lawsuit against
a local homeowner who, opposed to local development by Terra
Homes, picketed the development with a sign that read: "This neigh-
borhood will not be Terra-ized. ''41  Terra Homes promptly sued the
homeowner for defamation claiming that he had no right to call the
company "a terrorist."'42
b. Business torts - Business torts are also a common foundation
for complaints in SLAPP suits. A business tort is a breach of a legal
duty by a business that causes an individual to suffer injury or sustain
damages. Causes of action for interference with a contract (or inter-
ference with business relationships) and a claim for restraint of trade
are both business torts.4 3 The showing required for interference with
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS sec. 559. In New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964), the United States Supreme Court redefined the common law of defamation when the
Court heard what may have been the first SLAPP suit. The case resulted when the New York
Times printed an advertisement alleging that the Montgomery, Alabama police department had
a political of practicing police brutality and violation of citizens' civil rights. The plaintiff, the
Montgomery police commissioner, won a five hundred thousand dollar libel judgment. The law
of libel, as it existed in 1964, placed the burden on the defendant to show that his statements
were true. At that time, if the defendant were unable to meet this burden, then he would most
probably be found liable to pay damages. In this sense the common law of libel approximated a
form of strict liability.
Justice William Brennan, writing for the majority, recognized the potential "chilling effect"
inherent in the law of defamation on citizen participation in the democratic process. Brennan,
reversing the trial court's verdict, wrote that the First Amendment exudes "a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issue should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks
on government and public officials." In order to preserve this national commitment to open and
robust debate from the inhibitory characteristic of defamation law, the Court imposed a new rule
requiring that in actions involving public officials [later extended in some degree to public
figures and issues of public interest], the plaintiff must show by clear and convincing evidence
actual "malice" on the part of the defendant. In the context of this new rule, actual malice
means a statement with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth.
The addition of actual malice as an essential element to defamation actions for cases involving
the public interest greatly reduced the threat of plaintiffs prevailing in their lawsuits. However,
New York Tunes does not remove, nor does the decision address, the incentive a plaintiff has to
file such lawsuits for purposes of intimidating a small group from opposing his objectives. Ironi-
cally, the requirement of actual malice actually lends itself to requiring lengthier, costlier, and
more burdensome discovery. As a result, many defendants are subjected to long and costly legal
proceedings and trials even when it appears that the conduct at issue is protected by the First
Amendment.
Although New York Times and its progeny provide substantive legal protection against jury
verdicts, the decisions do little to discourage the incentive for filing SLAPP suits, particularly if
the objectives of the litigation can be met by pre-trial tactics.
41. Waldman, supra note 38, at 986 (citing Holzberg, Defamation Suits "Chill" Activists,
NAT'L LJ., July 25, 1988, at 3, cols. 1,3).
42. Id.
43. Waldman, supra note 39, at 987.
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a contract is "an intentional disruption of a potential economic advan-
tage (or of a contract), plus causation and damages. There is no need
to prove that the defendant acted with ill will toward the plaintiff."
Because of this, some legal commentators have suggested that the
standard of proof that the plaintiff must bear is lower and therefore
easier to demonstrate than in other tort claims."
The typical case of interference with a contract often involves a
charge that a SLAPP defendant solicited a party, usually a govern-
mental entity, into action that breached a contract. If the SLAPP de-
fendant, usually an advocate, actually caused enough of a change to
the governmental entity's previous commitment with the SLAPP
plaintiff, then the plaintiff is in a position to claim injury to his busi-
ness and to present a prima facie case for interference.
In an early and well-known SLAPP case, Sierra Club v. Butz,
4 5
Humboldt Fir was a logging company that alleged injury when the
Sierra Club sought an injunction against further logging in a forest
area which was eligible for protection under the National Wilderness
Preservation System. Humboldt sued the Sierra Club for, among
44. Id
Some commentators suggest that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine may in some courts provide a
substantive defense for a defendant in this type of action. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine arises
from antitrust law but has been interpreted by some courts to provide constitutional protection
-for certain conduct that falls outside the antitrust sphere.
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine, developed in antitrust law, was predicated upon Eastern Rail-
road President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). In that case, a
railroad organization fought deregulation of the trucking industry in several states. The rail-
road's opposition was in the form of paid advertisements and press releases. The district court
concluded that the motivation fueling the defendant's opposition was protection of its market
share, which was a substantial interest. The Supreme Court ruled that motivation alone cannot
violate the antitrust laws when the defendants' actions were legitimate governmental petitioning.
To determine whether the defendants' use of the government process was legitimate or a
"sham," the court developed an outcome-process test. If the defendant looks toward the out-
come of the governmental process to resolve the dispute, then the petitioning conduct is
legitimate.
In comparison to substantive First Amendment protections, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine
would lend itself to quicker procedural disposition. With a lawsuit where the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine is applied, some courts have imposed a specific pleading requirement of sham petition-
ing. Such a pleading requirement mandates that the plaintiff show that the defendant's petition-
ing was a sham in order to survive summary judgment. This places the burden on the plaintiff to
allege specific facts that the defendant misused the governmental process to effectuate his goals.
Furthermore, the sham requirement, unlike actual malice, concerns itself with the defendant's
conduct, not a state of mind, making it generally easier to prove. Since this requirement is
imposed at the pleading stage, a court can dismiss a lawsuit before any costly discovery is
undertaken.
In 1984, the Colorado Supreme Court applied Noerr-Pennington and indicated that upon a
motion to dismiss a plaintiff must make a showing of sham petitioning. Protect Our Mountain
Envt., Inc. v. District Court, 677 P.2d. 1361 (Colo. 1984). However, many courts do not believe
that Noerr-Pennngton is of constitutional dimensions. Instead, these courts have chosen to nar-
rowly interpret the doctrine as applying only to suits alleging a violation of the antitrust statutes.
45. 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
9
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other things, economic interference. Humboldt charged that the Si-
erra Club induced the United States government into breaching a tim-
ber contract when it sought an injunction against further logging in the
protected acreage.'
c. Civil Rights Violations - Third, plaintiffs often claim a violation
of the basic and fundamental rights which are guaranteed to every
United States citizen under the Constitution, due process and equal
protection. The Warembourg47 case study is a clear illustration.
When a neighborhood advocate Johnson rallied enough supporters to
force the City Council to'hold a referendum on the issue of further
annexation by the city, the land developer sued Johnson and several
others for constitutional violations of due process and equal
protection.48
d. Conspiracy to commit one of the above tortious acts - Another
technique often utilized by SLAPP plaintiffs is to charge that a de-
fendant is part of a conspiracy to commit one of the tortious acts listed
above. In Brownvsille Golden Age Nursing Home, Inc. v. Wells,
4 9
Joanna Snyder and Paula Wells were interested in locating a nursing
home to care for a relative. On a visit to the Brownsville Golden Age
Nursing Home in Pennsylvania, they were shocked to see the poor
treatment that the nursing home residents received. Consequently,
they complained to a number of officials including state health offi-
cials, news agencies and politicians. When the nursing home concerns
were investigated, the state found some of the allegations to be valid
and promptly revoked the license. In retaliation, the Brownsville
Golden Age Nursing Home sued Snyder, Wells and others for "tor-
tiously conspiring to interfere with the. nursing home's business
relations."50
e. Misuse of judicial process - Though not technically an affirma-
tive cause of action in SLAPP litigation, occasionally a counterclaim
will be based on theories of abuse of process or malicious prosecution.
In City of Angoon v. Hodel,51 the Sierra Club initially sued the United
States Secretary of the Interior to "overturn a conveyance of land to
Shee Atika and stop logging on Admiralty Island." 52 Shee Atika
counterclaimed under the theory of abuse of process based on the lis
pendens filed by the Sierra Club but ultimately lost the suit when the
46. Sierra Club, 349 F. Supp. at 935-36.
47. See supra text accompanying note 19.
48. See generally Pring, supra note 3.
49. 839 F.2d 155 (3rd Cir. 1988).
50. Id. at 157-58.
51. 836 F.2d 1245 (9th Cir. 1988).
52. Id. at 1246.
1995]
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Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the lis pendens filing was
not abuse of process.53
The primary remedy sought by the SLAPP plaintiff is one of money
damages. The average award sought in SLAPP litigation is nine mil-
lion dollars.54 Injunctions or declaratory relief are usually sought as
secondary relief.55 The priority that the SLAPP plaintiff places on the
monetary damages, as opposed to other remedies designed to termi-
nate the defendant's actions, serves to bolster the premise that SLAPP
suits are designed to intimidate defendants into silence. The SLAPP
defendant potentially faces enormous damages and must bear sub-
stantial legal costs to defend himself against the SLAPP suit. This ele-
ment often serves as a deterrent to the defendant and others privy to
the lawsuit in terms of further participation in the SLAPP-related ac-
tivity or other future activities that might result in the same sort of
litigation
III. ALTERNATIVE VIEWS OF A SLAPP SUIT
Some legal commentators have taken a more marginal view of the
SLAPP phenomenon. Based on a study conducted in California, 56
Thomas Waldman contends that the issue of SLAPPs is one of con-
flicting values:
On the one hand, .... political protests have social costs. Pesky activ-
ists can undermine legitimate business interests or injure the reputa-
53. Id. at 1247-48.
Some have argued that SLAPP defendants themselves should countersue for malicious prose-
cution, creating a SLAPP-back suit. To prevail on a malicious prosecution counterclaim, one
must show that the underlying proceeding was favorably decided and that the underlying pro-
ceeding was bought without probable cause and with malice. In California there were two
SLAPP-back verdicts for 11.1 million and 13 million dollars. See Appeal of Milestone Damages
Case Fails, L.A. TiMEs, October 4, 1991, at A3, col. 5 and A New Way to Intimidate Activists,
UTmm READER, Nov./Dec., 1989.
There are, however, drawbacks to SLAPP-back suits. First, lack of probable cause and malice
are difficult to prove. Second, the countersuit will require more litigation expense. This is a
problem for many SLAPP defendants, particularly if they are small or local citizens' groups as
contrasted to larger and more established groups like the Sierra Club. Indeed, it is the financial
vulnerability of the SLAPP defendant which makes him a target of the initial SLAPP suit in the
first instance. For the most part, a SLAPP defendant would like to see the lawsuit go away.
However, Professor Pring has not discounted the value of the countersuit as a tactical tool.
"Now SLAPP plaintiffs must realize that besides probably losing the case, there's also a chance
of losing millions in a countersuit. This sends a signal no attorney can ignore." See A New Way
to Intimidate Acitivsts, UTNE READER, NovlDec., 1989.
54. Benson & Merriam, supra note 38, at 841.
55. Robert I. McMurry and David H. Pierce, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation
(SLAPPS): The Benefits and Risks, C750 A.L.I. - A.B.A. 823, 828 (citing the Pring analysis).
56. See generally Waldman, supra note 39. Thomas A. Waldman is a recent graduate of
UCLA School of Law. In 1992, working closely with Professor David Binder of UCA, he con-
ducted a detailed study of SLAPP suits in the state of California. The results of this study are
examined in his article cited above.
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tion of others. As a result, constitutional protections for activism are
not absolute. On the other hand, one price of democracy may be en-
during unnecessary, undesirable political activity without resorting to
the courts to stop it. SLAPP suits thrive on the margin between the
state interest in orderly economic activity and activists' rights to ad-
vance their agenda.
57
While Waldman ultimately takes the view that SLAPP suits should
be controlled, he is careful to balance this opinion with a sympathetic
portrait of a SLAPP plaintiff, quoting Professor Gideon Kanner of
Loyola Law School who stated that "These people [anti-development
advocates] come out of the woodwork" and "have become drunk with
power." Kanner contends that public officials who want to get re-
elected are essentially "blackmailed" into ignoring a developer's right
to build on his or her own land.58 In these cases, the offensive use of a
lawsuit merely becomes a negotiating tool.
59
Furthermore, Waldman is less certain than Canan and Pring that a
SLAPP suit has a universal effect of chilling protected speech.
This chilling effect may not be universal. Consider the following state-
ment, which was made by the representative of a homeowners' group
responding to the survey reported in this comment: "I would not like
to think people would back down and not stand up for their beliefs
due to a threat of a lawsuit."6°
Waldman allows the label of SLAPP to include plaintiff suits which
are motivated for legitimate reasons: tortious conduct on the part of
the defendant which is independent from a plaintiff strategy to sup-
press the defendant's protected activity. In these cases, the plaintiff's
objective is not directly to silence the defendant, although the result of
such a suit may have this effect.6 ' This broad definition of SLAPP
may make it difficult for courts to identify SLAPP suits in a timely
manner so to eliminate their effectiveness.
Victor J. Cosentino of the California Western School of Law is an-
other commentator who has published an alternative view to the
Canan and Pring model.62 Cosentino identified several problems with
the Canan and Pring SLAPP delineation. He contends that Canan-
Pring's approach is too narrowly defined - to qualify under that
view, the defendant must have been advocating before a governmen-
tal entity regarding a matter of "public interest of concern." Cosen-
tino points out that the "First Amendment protects all legitimate
57. Waldman, supra note 39, at 982.
58. Waldman, supra note 39, at 986 (quoting Professor Kanner as cited in Ron Galperin,
Getting SLAPPed, L.A. Times, Apr. 29, 1990, at K1, col. 4, K. 15, col. 3).
59. Waldman, supra note 39, at 986.
60. Waldman, supra note 39, at 991.
61. Waldman, supra note 39, at 985.
62. See generally Cosentino, supra note 9.
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petitioning of government regardless of its objective." He posits that
the focus of SLAPPS should be on the plaintiff's motives in initiating
the lawsuit and not on the defendant's objectives in petitioning the
government.63
Alternatively, Cosentino contends that if a definition is too broad,
environmental countersuits will be labelled as SLAPP suits. Cosen-
tino suggests that these broad definitions would include countersuits
initiated by a business organization or an individual in response to an
earlier lawsuit brought by a citizen's group. "In this scenario, the origi-
nal suit is filed to stop some action which the plaintiff believes is detri-
mental to the environment. The defendant countersues solely to
intimidate the plaintiff."'
Cosentino outlines three reasons for excluding environmental
countersuits from the SLAPP definition:
These countersuits are distinguishable from SLAPPS for three rea-
sons. First, they have a different procedural posture which requires a
different procedural solution. Second, they are only used to counter
lawsuits initiated by other parties so the original plaintiff will have an-
ticipated both a legal battle and the possibility of a countersuit. In
contrast, SLAPPS are initiated against citizens who are using only the
political process to air their grievances. Those citizens are not antici-
pating, are not prepared for, and should not be subjected to legal ac-
tion. Finally, the chilling effect inherent in SLAPPS is probably not as
significant in countersuits.65
Under the Cosentino view, one of the earliest SLAPP-categorized
cases might not be considered to fall into the SLAPP suit category at
all. In Sierra Club v. Butz, the Sierra Club initiated court action seek-
ing a temporary injunction against further logging on some land po-
tentially protected by the National Wilderness Preservation System.
In response, the Club was sued for economic interference by one of
the logging companies, Humboldt Fir.'
In Cosentino's opinion, when a citizens' group takes the time and
trouble of initiating a lawsuit, it is the party changing the arena from a
political one to a judicial one. As well, the legal counsel for the citi-
zens' group will certainly have advised the group of the possibility of a
countersuit so it will likely have anticipated and prepared for such an
action.
In contrast, Cosentino urges that surprise for the purpose of intimi-
dation is an important element of a SLAPP suit. Under his definition
of SLAPP suit, the defendant/citizens' group is caught off-guard and
63. Cosentino, supra note 9, at 401.
64. Cosentino, supra note 9 at 405.
65. Cosentino, supra note 9, at 405.
66. 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
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its focus of concern about a particular issue is transformed into an
unanticipated legal battle having little to do with the initial matter.
Additionally, by his analytical framework, it is the citizens' group that
is being forced to move from the political arena to the judicial arena.
For this reason, Cosentino contends that SLAPP suits should be
viewed with the primary focus on the motive of the original plaintiff
and not on the defendant's goals in the original petition.67
Since the exact criteria and definition of SLAPP suits have not been
settled, it is difficult to estimate the true success of SLAPP suits.
Looking only at the final disposition of cases that actually make it to
court, the plaintiff rarely prevails because of the SLAPP defendant's
constitutionally protected rights to free speech and to petition the
government for redress of grievances. 68 One estimate holds that more
than eighty percent of these lawsuits are dimisssed by the courts,
"generally on grounds that the activity is protected as an exercise of
the opponent's First Amendment rights."6
In particular, SLAPP suits have rarely been successful and conse-
quently the tactic is not often used against strong activist organiza-
tions like the Sierra Club or the Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. The most likely reason is that* these groups are well-organized,
financially secure and have staff with the experience and expertise to
fend off such lawsuits.70
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF SLAPP SuIT LITIGATION
Both liberal and conservative legal scholars have criticized the
SLAPP suit as being "one of the most troubling legal trends in our
country."'" Probably the most serious concern is that this special kind
of lawsuit threatens to erode First Amendment rights for its sole pur-
pose is to "chill" healthy public dialogue.72
Research has shown that only a small percentage of Americans ac-
tually exercise their rights to participate in government. In fact, Amer-
icans have a significantly lower level of electoral voting participation
than other industrialized democratically-governed countries.73 Fur-
ther, if voting is discounted, only ten percent of Americans are ac-
tively involved in other types of political activity.74 Pring believes this
lack of government participation only serves to aggravate the problem
67. See generally Cosentino, supra note 9, at 403-405.
68. Benson & Merriam, supra note 38, at 843.
69. McMurray & Pierce, supra note 55, at 826-27.
70. Sive, supra note 36, at 1325-26.
71. Benson & Merriam, supra note 38, at 840.
72. Pring, supra note 3, at 943.
73. Pring, supra note 3, at 943 (citing the theoretical analysis of Taylor and Jodice).
74. Pring, supra note 3, at 943 (citing Milbraith's statistics).
1995]
14
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 21, No. 1 [1995], Art. 9
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol21/iss1/9
136 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21:122
of SLAPP suits. The "chilling effect" created by the lawsuit causes a
"ripple effect" throughout the community, and the already small per-
centage of citizens who would likely have participated by speaking at
a public hearing or writing letters to the media is effectively silenced.
Acknowledging that not all citizens will be intimidated into silence,
Pring believes that a great number will be daunted at the prospect of a
possible lawsuit.75
The detrimental effect of this type of lawsuit is long term. The folk-
lore and old war stories passing from one community to another which
detail the plight of "would-be" activists who were forced to pay
thousands of dollars to defend themselves in SLAPP suits will likely
prevent others from moving forward on similar development projects
in their areas. In an 1989 article on SLAPP suits, New York Attorney
General Robert Abrams examined the Love Canal issue76 and asked
the sobering question of "how much longer Love Canal might have
gone unchecked if we lived in a society without a significant level of
public participation." Attorney General Abrams further highlighted
the gravity of the SLAPP problem by stating that public participation
in environmental matters is "the cornerstone of our very survival as
a planet" and suggested that the results of silence could be
devastating.77
A second concern is that this type of litigation can force land use
decisions to become imbalanced ones. Local city and county planners
look to a myriad of sources and seek advice from diverse groups while
making important decisions regarding local land use. They often rely
on the varied opinions of developers, business leaders and affected
citizen or neighborhood groups as a natural balancing test in making
recommendations on zoning and land use permits. If the views of one
of these parties is effectively excluded, then the recommendations are
potentially imbalanced and more heavily weighted in the direction of
development, possibly at the cost of important public health or envi-
ronmental issues.78
75. Pring, supra note 3, at 943.
76. Love Canal, an area near Niagara Falls, New York, has been referred to as the "nation's
most infamous toxic dump." Laurie Goodstein, Army Linked to Love Canal Dumping; Docu-
ments Spur Charges of Coverup in Radioactive Waste Disposal, The WASINGTON PosT, May 18,
1991. This environmental issue has been covered in the national news for some fifteen years,
and a fourteen year court battle resulted in a settlement of ninety-eight million dollars. 98 Mil-
lion in Love Canal Suit, TmE WAsINGTON PosT, June 22, 1994, at Sec. A, pg. 2.
77. Benson & Merriam, supra note 38, at 840 (quoting from Robert Abrams, Strategic Law-
suits Against Public Participation, 7 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 33 (1989)).
78. Benson & Merriam, supra note 38, at 841 (noting the case of Rick Welker from Enfield,
Connecticut who actively worked to bar a proposed development from his community by accus-
ing the town officials of making "back room deals" with the developer. Welker participated in a
series of Planning and Zoning Commission meetings and after a lengthy review, the develop-
ment plans were overturned. In retaliation, the developer sued Welker for economic damages
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An issue which affects both the plaintiff and defendant in a SLAPP
suit is the time-consuming nature of such litigation and the tremen-
dous expense that often must be invested.79 Most SLAPP suits take
many months (and maybe even years) to finalize, and the attorney's
fees alone can range in the tens of thousands of dollars.8" In the
Warembourg case, for example, an attorney advised Ms. Johnson, a
neighborhood advocate, that it would cost more than ten thousand
dollars to defend against the SLAPP suit.8 ' In addition, the damages
sought in SLAPP suits range anywhere from ten thousand dollars to
one hundred million dollars," with the average award sought being
approximately nine million dollars.83
Some have argued that the problem of expense is compounded by
the fact that current libel laws offer little protection to those defend-
ants who do not have the financial or legal resources necessary to
combat these constitutional claims.' Professor David Anderson of
the University of Texas Law School states:
But the law that protects media so well from ultimate judgments pro-
tects poorly against harassment, the financial and journalistic costs of
litigating, or the spectre of devastating loss. It fails to discourage the
filing of libel suits for intimidation and other collateral purposes. It
invites extensive discovery which multiplies the potential for harass-
ment. It fails to place any advance limits on damages, which encour-
ages the parties to treat virtually any dispute as a potential high-stakes
case and to litigate accordingly. And although the appellate courts so
far generally have controlled the eventual damage awards effectively,
no media lawyer can assure a client that its case will not be the first in
which a catastrophic judgement is affirmed.
The result is a system that works quite well for those defendants
who have more wealth, better counsel, and more staying power than
their adversaries.8
5
Noting that Anderson's comments are directed to news media orga-
nizations, the effect would be even more severe for individual defend-
resulting from Welker's vocal opposition. Welker's defense team made a motion to dismiss
which was eventually granted.).
79. See generally Pring, supra note 3 (where, in addition to the Warembourg case, he cites
numerous other illustrations of SLAPP suits).
80. Pring, supra note 3, at 943.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Benson & Merriam, supra note 38, at 841.
84. David Anderson, Who Needs Libel Reform?, 338 P.L.I./Pat. 639 (1992).
David Anderson is the Thompson and Knight Centennial Professor at the University of Texas
Law School. Having over twenty years of experience in the field of libel law, Professor Ander-
son has written extensively on the subject. His review in the article above concludes that" [t]he
present law works pretty well for the most influential members of the media community, though
poorly for nearly everyone else."
85. Id. at 642.
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ants who had no legal resources or advisors. Additionally, Anderson
believes that first-rate attorneys specializing in First Amendment free
speech issues are hard to locate. Once found, they are either ex-
tremely expensive to retain or are already working for the opposition,
who can better afford the costs. These lawyers are members of some
of America's best law firms and often far more knowledgeable in First
Amendment issues than most of the attorneys they confront. They
have a "virtual monopoly on legal expertise in a Byzantine field of law
that the novice has little chance of mastering."'
Professors Canan and Pring believe that literally hundreds of
SLAPP suits are filed every year and that SLAPP defendants win in
court the majority of the time, estimating their success rate at eighty-
three percent.8 7 The problem, however, is that when these lawsuits
are lumped with already tremendous backlog that courts are exper-
iencing, it can often take an average of thirty-six months for a SLAPP
case to be finalized.88
Remembering that one of the major objectives of the SLAPP suit is
to simply distract the activists by drawing them into a legal battle, it is
hard to appreciate that these types of cases are deserving in the al-
ready overburdened federal and state court systems. It is even more
difficult to reconcile when one considers that SLAPP suits are gener-
ally baseless claims with the ultimate goal of silencing the opponent
who may be providing a valuable service to the community by raising
genuine environmental or public health concerns. The irony is that a
SLAPP suit does not have to succeed in court to meet its objectives.
It is simply the means chosen to silence the opposition. If fear sets in
and those hit with the SLAPP suit indeed terminate their earlier activ-
ities which initially led to their being "slapped" with a lawsuit, then
the SLAPP plaintiff will have succeeded.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACrION
In addition to substantive law defenses, there have been several
procedural and statutory responses to the phenomenon of SLAPP
suits.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 states:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him
that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best
of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable in-
quiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a
86. Id. at 643.
87. Pring, supra note 3, at 943.
88. Benson & Merriam, supra note 38, at 840 (citing Penelope Canan, The SLAPP from a
Sociological Perspective, 7 PACE ENrIv... L. REv. 23, 26 (1989)).
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good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of ex-
isting law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such
as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the
cost of litigation.89
Certainly, the language of Rule 11, like many of its state counter-
parts, 9° encompasses a response to the typical SLAPP suit. As a re-
sult, many lawmakers are unwilling to enact legislation to combat the
problem of SLAPP suits. However, lawmakers should be made aware
that Rule 11 is not the panacea that some believe it to be.91
There are some problems with Rule 11 sanctions. First, the sanc-
tions are discretionary, and, thus, subject to judicial inconsistencies
even in the imposition. 2 In the event that a judge, does impose sanc-
tions, he retains the authority to set the amount of such sanctions.
93
Therefore, even if a plaintiff is sanctioned, the amount does not neces-
sarily have to cover the defendant's costs and attorney's fees.
Moreover, Rule 11 sanctions must be pled, and sometimes argued,
separately.94 This imposes most costs and litigation time on the
SLAPP defendant, and again, there is no guarantee of prevailing. Fi-
nally, sanctions usually will not be considered until after discovery,
often an expensive and time-consuming process in itself.
Some state lawmakers have proposed legislation to confront the
problem of SLAPP suits. Most, if not all, of these proposals provide
for attorney's fees and recoupment of court costs for a defendant who
can show he was the victim of a frivolous SLAPP suit. However, the
problem of identifying a SLAPP suit remains, and often legislative
proposals do not address this.
In Washington, a law was passed which immunized citizens who
"complain to a public entity in good faith and without actual mal-
ice."' 95 However, such a law just repeats present day First Amend-
ment jurisprudence and provides no statutory guidance to courts in
identifying SLAPP suits quickly. Another shortcoming of the statute
89. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
90. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §. 1A-1, Rule 11.
91. See Waldman, supra note 39, at 1035 (noting that the Supreme Court has posited, "It is
now clear that the central purpose of Rule 11 is to deter baseless filing in district court." Cooter
& Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. 496 U.S. 386 (1990)).
92. Waldman, supra note 39, at 1035.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.510 (1993).
Good faith communication to government agency - Immunity.
A person who in good faith communicates a complaint or information to any agency of fed-
eral, state, or local government regarding any matter reasonably of concern to that agency shall
be immune from civil liability on claims based upon the communication to the agency. A person
prevailing upon the defense provided for in this section shall be entitled to recover costs and
reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in establishing the defense.
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is that only direct petitioning of a "public entity" is protected. This
leaves activities such as picketing, writing letters to the editor or dis-
tributing leaflets unprotected. 96
Though not solving the dilemma of statutory definition, a more
monetarily effective legislative solution enacted by the Washington
legislature was the statutory provision authorizing intervention on be-
half of the defendants by a local governmental agency or the state
attorney general. 97 In this regard, once the defendant has made a
showing that he may be the victim of a SLAPP suit, the state attorney
general may intervene as counsel on behalf of the defendant. This pro-
cedure would offer financial reassurance to a defendant served with a
lawsuit. Further, this proposed response evens the playing field in
that it protects the plaintiff's access to the courts by providing for the
recoupment of costs a plaintiff incurs when proving that the defend-
ant's conduct was not protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.98
However, there are some limitations to the intervention provision
of the statute. As with the provision authorizing the recovery of costs,
intervention is only allowed when the defendant's conduct involved
direct petitioning of a governmental unit. Thus letter writing, picket-
ing and other forms of public participation go unprotected. Sec-
ondly, intervention is discretionary, and because many state attorney
general offices are financially constrained, actual intervention in most
cases is unlikely. 00
California and New York enacted legislation which heightens the
plaintiff's pleading requirements in suits involving public petitioning.
In California, upon a defendant's motion to strike, a plaintiff must
show a "probability" that he would prevail on the merits in order to
96. See McBride, supra note 10, at 947.
97. Wash. REv. CODE § 4.24.520 (1993).
Good faith communication to government agency -When agency or attorney general may
defend against lawsuit-Costs and fees
In order to protect the free flow of information from citizens to their government, an agency
receiving a complaint or information under RCW 4.24.510 may intervene in and defend against
any suit precipitated by the communication to the agency. In the event that a local governmen-
tal agency does not intervene in and defend against a suit arising from any communication pro-
tected under this act, the office of the attorney general may intervene in and defend against the
suit.
98. Id.
An agency prevailing upon the defense provided for in RCW 4.24.510 shall be entitled to
recover costs and reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in establishing the defense. If the agency
fails to establish the defense provided for in RCW 4.24.510, the party bringing the action shall be
entitled to recover from the agency costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred in proving the
defense inapplicable or invalid.
99. See McBride, supra note 10, at 947-48.
100. Id.
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survive the motion.0'0 If a plaintiff fails to survive this motion, then
the court may, in its discretion, award costs and attorney's fees. °2
The California law is presently the strongest medicine yet to dis-
courage the filing of SLAPP suits. What is troubling about the Cali-
fornia law, however, is exactly what many civil libertarians fear - a
legislative overreaction that creates a "chilling effect" on the exercise
of one's right of access to the courts. The burden that the plaintiff
bears - essentially having to prove his case in the preliminary stages
of trial - could deter all but the most airtight claim. Thus, a corpo-
rate plaintiff with a legtitmate claim may find himself not filing, even
though he may have been wrongfully injured, because of this inability
to survive a preliminary motion to strike. Thus, the California law
possesses the inequity and imbalance of creating a chilling effect on
one group's exercise of a constitutional right in an attempt to remove
the chilling effect on another group's exercise of constitutional rights.
Indeed, it is not hard to imagine a situation where a corporate plaintiff
may be foreclosed from a judicial remedy for a tortious act committed
against the corporation based solely on the status of the parties -
huge corporate plaintiff vs. small local citizens groups. 03
The New York legislature recently amended its civil rights laws to
provide protection for those who legitimately exercise their First
Amendment rights and are sued as a result. The laws which became
effective on January 1, 1993, essentially do two things to discourage
101. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b) (West Supp. 1993).
A cause of action against a person arising from any act of the person in furtherance of the
person's right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in
connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court
determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will pre-
vail on the claim. In making its determination, the court shall consider the pleadings, and sup-
porting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.
If the court determines that the plaintiff has established a probability that he or she will pre-
vail on the claim, neither the determination nor the fact of that determination shall be admissible
in evidence at any later stage of the case, and no burden of proof or degree of proof otherwise
applicable shall be affected by that determination.
102. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 425.16(c) (West Supp. 1993).
In any action subject to subdivision (b), a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike
shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney's fees and costs. If the court finds that a special
motion to strike is frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary delay, the court shall
award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to a plaintiff prevailing on the motion ....
103. It is not difficult to imagine a hypothetical scenario - a local environmentalist group,
formed to oppose the economic development of a certain piece of land, may make exaggerated
or even false allegations in order to garner sympathy for their opposition to the project. As a
result of adverse publicity and ensuing public outcry, the corporation loses its bid to develop the
land and sustains losses. The corporation brings suit against the activists claiming defamation.
However, because of the very status of the parties involved and the nature of the complaint, the
court will be on notice of a possible SLAPP suit. If the corporation is required to prove a
"probability" of prevailing and that burden is difficult or impossible to meet, then the losses of
the corporation will be borne immediately by stockholders and, potentially, by the consumer in
the form of higher prices.
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SLAPP suits: (1) raise the standard of proof for "actual malice" to
that of clear and convincing evidence and (2) authorize the mainte-
nance of a claim to recover attorney's fees, compensatory damages
and punitive damages against any party who "commenced or contin-
ued for the purpose of harassing, intimidating, punishing, or inhibiting
the defendant from exercising First Amendment rights."' 4
Unfortunately, New York's legislative response mirrors the protec-
tion and shortcomings of the substantive law doctrines. 0 5 Section 70-
a does allow that a counterclaim for filing and maintaining a frivolous
lawsuit [essentially a malicious prosecution counterclaim] can be com-
menced without a showing that the original claim was resolved in
favor of the defendant.
Holding these legislative responses in perspective, it appears that
Washington's straightforward intervention provision remains the best
policy implementation in that it balances the need to discourage
SLAPP suit filings with a consideration that all should have access to
the courts. However, certain modifications should be explored.
First, protected activities under the rule should be expanded to in-
clude non-governmental conduct such as distributing leaflets, writing
letters to the editor and other regulatory agencies, and demonstrating.
Second, the state should make available sufficient recourse to ensure
104. N.Y. Crv. RIGrrs LAW § 70-a (McKinney 1994),
Actions involving public petition and participation; recovery of damages
1. A defendant in an action involving public petition and participation, as defined in para-
graph (a) of subdivision (1) of § 76-a of this article, may maintain an action, claim, cross claim or
counterclaim to recover damages, including costs and attorney's fees, from any person who com-
menced or continued such action ....
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTs LAW § 76-a (McKinney 1994).
Actions involving public petition and participation; when actual malice to be proven
1. For purposes of this section:
(a) An "action involving public petition and participation" is an action, claim, cross
claim or counterclaim for damages that is brought by a public applicant or permittee, and
is materially related to any efforts of the defendant to report on, comment on, rule on,
challenge or oppose such application or permission.
(b) "Public applicant or permittee" shall mean any person who has applied for or ob-
tained a permit, zoning change, lease, license, certificate or other entitlement for use or
permission to act from any government body, or any person with an interest, connection
or affiliation with such person that is materially related to such application or permission.
(c) "Communication" shall mean any statement, claim, allegation in a proceeding, deci-
sion, protest, writing, argument, contention or other expression.
(d) "Government body" shall mean any municipality, the state, any other political sub-
division or agency of such, the federal government, any public benefit corporation, or any
public authority, board, or commission.
2. In an action involving public petition and participation, damages may only be recovered if
the plaintiff, in addition to all other necessary elements, shall have established by clear and
convincing evidence that any communication which gives rise to the action was made with
knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether it was false, where the truth or
falsity of such communication is material to the cause of action at issue.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 40 and 44 and notes 40 and 44.
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that the attorney general or governmental agencies will actually inter-
vene when a citizen's First Amendment rights are threatened - per-
haps a combination of additional funding and promulgation of
regulatory guidelines for agencies. Third, borrowing from the New
York laws, the governmental agency should initiate and pursue a mali-
cious prosecution claim on behalf of the defendants. The incentive for
the governmental agency to take this course of action would be the
potential of covering its costs for its initial intervention. This could be
accomplished by having the defendant reimburse the government
agency for costs incurred while defending the original SLAPP and by
sharing in any judgment. Furthermore, if an award of punitive dam-
ages results, the government agency should collect a percentage, thus
providing a budget surplus to defend other suits. 1°6
VI. CONCLUSION
While there are variations in delineating and quantifying the results
of SLAPP suits, there can be no doubt that the legal phenomenon
exists. Quantifying the number of suits, delineating their parameters,
calculating damages is an easy task compared to the nearly impossible
task of measuring the chilling effect that this type of lawsuit may have
on public debate. Therefore, state legislatures should be called on to
attack the problem of SLAPP suits and those who file them. The
courts should also be on guard, because the repugnancy of using the
judicial system to circumvent free speech is an affront to anyone who
values the ideals of American democracy and citizen participation.
106. One idea is to have public pro bono agencies also defend these suits with the aid of
governmental assistance. If the government identifies a potential SLAPP defendant, the case
could be referred to a litigation clinic or legal services agency. There the case would be pursued,
and in the event of a favorable jury award, the defendant and the pro bono agency could share a
percentage. This would prevent a windfall to the plaintiff and help defer the costs that the pro
bono agency incurred in handling the case.
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